In order to protect copyrighted material, codes may be embedded in the content or codes may be associated with the keys used to recover the content. Codes can o er protection by providing some form of traceability for pirated data. Several researchers have studied di erent notions of traceability and related concepts in recent years. \Strong" versions of traceability allow at least one member of a coalition that constructs a \pi-rate decoder" to be traced. Weaker versions of this concept ensure that no coalition can \frame" a disjoint user or group of users. All these concepts can be formulated as codes having certain combinatorial properties.
Introduction
In this paper, we are interested in combinatorial methods to allow tracing of illegally \pi-rated" data. We present two scenarios to motivate the problems we consider. The rst example concerns decoder boxes for decrypting broadcast messages; the second concerns variants of pay-per-view movies.
In the broadcast encryption scheme suggested by Chor, Fiat and Naor in 6], a decoder box consists of N keys, where each key takes on one of q possible values. The set of possible values for the ith key is, in general, di erent from the set of possible values for the jth key, if i 6 = j. A decoder box x can be represented as an N-tuple (x 1 ; ; x N ), where 1 x i q for 1 i N. A coalition might create a pirate decoder in which, for each 1 i N, the ith key is selected from one of the decoder boxes held by the coalition. From the point of view of the company that distributes decoder boxes, it would be useful to be able to identify one or more of the members of a coalition that produced a pirate decoder, once a pirate decoder is con scated.
The second example, described in Fiat and Tassa 10], concerns pay-per-view movies. Suppose a pay-per-view movie is divided into N segments, and each segment has q possible variations. The possible variations of a segment could have the same \content", but be \marked" in some not easily detected manner. A di erent variation of the movie is broadcast to each subscriber. A copy of the movie, denoted x, can therefore be represented as an Ntuple (x 1 ; ; x N ), where 1 x i q for 1 i N. A coalition might try to create a pirate copy of the movie by copying segments from the versions broadcast to them, in much the same way as a coalition produced a pirate decoder box in the example described above. The cable company would like to design a scheme that enables the identi cation of one or more of the members of a coalition that produced a pirated movie.
Related Work
This paper studies codes with the independent parent property (IPP), traceability (TA) codes, frameproof (FP) codes and secure-frameproof (SFP) codes. IPP codes are introduced in 12] . In 12] , IPP codes are studied for coalitions of pirate users of size two or less. One of the main goals of our work is to study and provide context for IPP codes when coalitions are of arbitrary size.
TA codes are discussed in 6, 17]. In 17], TA codes are studied in a more general setting, where codewords are replaced by N-subsets of a q-set. This setting is appropriate for the \decoder box" application, but not for the \pirated movie" application. More recently, traceability codes have been generalized to \dynamic traitor tracing" schemes in 10].
Frameproof codes are introduced in 5]. A stronger form of frameproof codes, secureframeproof codes, is introduced in 16] In this paper, we demonstrate that both types of codes are weaker than IPP codes and TA codes. Hence, all of our constructions of IPP and TA codes are also examples of FP and SFP codes.
De nitions
Both of the examples from the previous section can be modeled using similar mathematical notation and de nitions. As well there is weaker version of this concept ensuring that no coalition can \frame" a disjoint user or group users, introduced in 5] and 16]. Now we use a uniform notation to give several de nitions, as follows.
Consider a code C of length N on an alphabet Q with jQj = q. Then C Q N and we will call it an (N; n; q)-code if jCj = n. The elements of C called codewords; each codeword x = (x 1 ; ; x N ), where x i 2 Q, 1 i N.
For any subset of codewords C 0 C, we de ne the set of descendants of C 0 , denoted desc(C 0 ) by desc(C 0 ) = fx 2 Q N : x i 2 fa i : a 2 C 0 g; 1 i Ng: The set desc(C 0 ) consists of the N-tuples that could be produced by a coalition holding the codewords in the set C 0 . Now, let w be a positive integer. For a code C, de ne the w-descendant code of C, denoted desc w (C), as follows:
The set desc w (C) consists of the N-tuples that could be produced by some coalition of size at most w.
We now give the following de nitions concerning traceability properties of codes.
De nition 1.1 Suppose C is an (N; n; q)-code and w 2 is an integer. Let C i C; i = 1; 2; ; t, be all the subsets of C such that jC i j w. (Hence t = P w j=1 ? n j .)
1. C is a w-FP (frameproof) code provided that for all x 2 desc w (C), x 2 desc(C i ) \ C implies x 2 C i . 2. C is a w-SFP (secure-frameproof) code provided that for all x 2 desc w (C), x 2 desc(C i ) \ desc(C j ) implies that C i \ C j 6 = ;, where i 6 = j. 3 . C is a w-IPP (identi able parent property) code provided that for all x 2 desc w (C), it holds that \ fi:x2desc(C i )g C i 6 = ;: 4 . For x; y 2 Q N , de ne I(x; y) = fi : x i = y i g: C is a w-TA (traceability) code provided that, for all x 2 desc w (C), x 2 desc(C i ) implies that there is at least one codeword y 2 C i such that jI(x; y)j > jI(x; z)j for any z 2 CnC i .
The \meaning" of the above de nitions is as follows: A code is w-frameproof if no coalition of size at most w can frame another user not in the coalition by producing the codeword held by that user. A code is w-secure frameproof if no coalition of size at most w can frame a disjoint coalition of size at most w by producing an N-tuple that could have been produced by the second coalition. w-frameproof and w-secure-frameproof codes are discussed in 5, 17, 16] for binary codes. Our de nitions here extend these concepts to the non-binary case. Note that, in our model, we do not allow \unreadable" bits in the N-tuples (see 5, 16] ). A code has the w-identi able parent property if no coalition of size at most w can produce an N-tuple that cannot be traced back to at least one member of the coalition. w-traceability codes are also w-IPP codes (see Lemma 1.3 below). The advantage of the w-TA property is that it allows an e cient (i.e., linear-time) algorithm to determine an identi able parent. Proof. Suppose C is a w-TA code. If x 2 desc w (C), then there is a subset C i C, where jC i j = w, such that x 2 desc(C i ). Let y 2 C i such that jI(x; y)j jI(x; z)j for all z 2 C i . Thus jI(x; y)j jI(x; z)j for any z 2 C by the de nition of a w-TA code. We will show that, for any C j C with jC j j w, x 2 desc(C j ) implies y 2 C j . In fact, if y 6 2 C j , then there is w 2 C j such that jI(x; w)j > jI(x; y)j by the de nition of a w-TA code. This contradicts the fact that jI(x; y)j jI(x; z)j for any z 2 C.
The following example shows that a code having the IPP property does not necessarily have the TA property. Example 1.4 A 4-IPP (3; 4; 4)-code which is not a 2-TA code.
Let C = f011; 123; 211; 332g. Then C is 4-IPP, since the symbols in the rst position of all the codewords are di erent. But it is not a 2-TA code. For example, let x = 111. Then x is a descendant of f123; 011g. However, jI(x\123)j = 1 and jI(x\011)j = jI(x\211)j = 2.
Thus the code is not a 2-TA code.
Remark. Several explicit constructions for 2-IPP codes are given in 12]. It can be veri ed that the majority of these codes are not 2-TA codes. So the above example is not unusual.
Remark. It is easy to see that there are w-FPC codes that are not w-IPP codes. For example, constructions are given in 16] for w-FPC codes on a binary alphabet, for all w 2. However, we will show that a w-IPP code cannot exist on an alphabet of size less than w.
The purpose of all the types of codes studied in this paper is to discourage a possible coalition from constructing illegal N-tuples. If an illegal N-tuple is constructed by a coalition of size at most w, then it is possible to identify at least one of the traitors if the code is w-IPP or w-TA. The following lemma shows that we cannot expect to identify all the traitors, except for certain \trivial" codes. Lemma 1.5 Suppose C is any (N; n; q) code with n > q. Then there exist three codewords y; z; z 0 and x 2 Q N such that x 2 desc(fy; zg) \ desc(fy; z 0 g). Proof. There exists a coordinate k such that z k = z 0 k 6 = y k . For convenience, assume that k = 1. Then de ne x = (x 1 ; ; x N ) 2 Q N as follows:
x 1 = z 1 (= z 0 1 ) x i = y i for 2 i N: Clearly, x 2 desc(fy; zg) \ desc(fy; z 0 g).
Note that there is always a trivial (N; q; q) code which is \totally traceable": the codewords are (1; : : :; 1), : : : , (q; : : :; q). In this paper, we are interested only in codes with n > q.
We now prove another impossibility result, which shows that w-IPP codes cannot exist for certain parameter situations. This result is a generalization of 16, Theorem 2.1]. Lemma 1.6 Suppose C is any (N; n; q) code, and n ? 1 w q. Then C is not a w-IPP code.
Proof. Let z 1 ; ; z w+1 2 C. For 1 i N, let y i be chosen such that jfj : z j i = y i gj 2: (This can be done using the pigeonhole principle, because w + 1 > q.) Then let y = (y 1 ; ; y N ). Now, it is easy to see that y 2 desc(fz 1 ; ; z w+1 gnfz j g) for any j, 1 j w + 1. Hence C is not w-IPP.
Finally, we notice that the case of w N is very restrictive, as shown in the following lemma. Lemma 1.7 Suppose C is an (N; n; q) w-FP code, where w N. Then q n.
Proof. If q < n, then we can show that C is not w-FP. Let x 2 C. Since q < n, there is a codeword x ; ; x N ). As mentioned above, codes with q n exist trivially.
Connections between Hash Families and Traceability Codes
Perfect hash families have undergone considerable study due to their applications in information retrieval; see 7] for an extensive survey. More recently, perfect hash families and related structures such as separating hash families (see 16]) have found applications in cryptography. We will discuss some of these applications in this section; other applications are given in 2].
De nition 2.1 Let n m. An (n; m)-hash function is a function h : A ! B, where jAj = n and jBj = m. An (n; m)-hash family is a nite set H of (n; m)-hash functions such that h : A ! B for each h 2 H, where jAj = n and jBj = m. We use the notation HF(N; n; m) to denote an (n; m)-hash family with jHj = N.
De nition 2.2 Let n; m and w be integers such that n m w 2. An (n; m; w)-perfect hash family is an (n; m)-hash family, H, such that for any X A with jXj = w, there exists at least one h 2 H such that hj X is injective. We use the notation PHF(N; n; m; w) to denote an (n; m; w)-perfect hash family with jHj = N.
De nition 2.3 Let n; m, w 1 and w 2 be positive integers such that n m. An (n; m; w 1 ; w 2 )-separating hash family is an (n; m)-hash family, H, such that for any X 1 ; X 2 A with jX 1 j = w 1 , jX 2 j = w 2 and X 1 \ X 2 = ;, there exists at least one h 2 H such that fh(x) : x 2 X 1 g\fh(x) : x 2 X 2 g = ;. We use the notation SHF(N; n; m; w 1 ; w 2 ) to denote an (n; m; ; w 1 ; w 2 )-separating hash family with jHj = N.
We can depict a (N; n; q)-code, C, as an n N matrix on q symbols, where each row of the matrix corresponds to one of the codewords. Similarly, we can represent an HF(N; n; m), H, as an N n matrix on m symbols, where each row of the matrix corresponds to one of the functions in H.
Given an (N; n; q)-code C, we de ne H(C) to be the HF(N; n; q) whose matrix representation is C T . Thus if C = fx 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n g and 1 j N, then the hash function h j 2 H(C) is de ned by the rule h j (i) = x i j , 1 i n:
Connections between separating and perfect hash families on the one hand, and codes with traceability properties, on the other hand, have been pointed out in several previous papers. We summarize previous results of this nature now. Theorem 2.6 12, Lemma 1] A (N; n; q)-code, C, is a 2-IPP code if and only if H(C) is simultaneously a PHF(N; n; q; 3) and an SHF(N; n; q; 2; 2).
We note that Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 are proved for binary alphabets in 17]. The extension to nonbinary alphabets is straightforward.
A relationship between w-IPP codes and perfect and separating hash families is given in the following theorem. Theorem 2.7 Suppose C is an (N; n; q) w-IPP code. Then we have the following.
1. H(C) is a PHF(N; n; q; w + 1) if n w + 1. 2. H(C) is an SHF(N; n; q; w; w) if n 2w. Proof. Suppose H(C) is not a PHF(N; n; q; w + 1). Then there exists w + 1 codewords in C such that in the ith position, for 1 i N, there are at least two codewords having the same symbol x i . Let x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x N ). Then it is easy to check that any w of these w + 1 codewords can produce x. Thus C does not have the w-IPP property.
The second conclusion follows from Theorem 2.5.
We cannot prove that the converse of Theorem 2.7 holds for w > 2. However, we can obtain w-IPP codes from certain perfect hash families, as follows. is an integer, so it follows that (w + 2) 2 
:
Now, since H(C) is a PHF(N; n; q; ), there exists a j; 1 j N, such that the elements y i j are all distinct for 1 i . Now consider x. There exists an r, 1 r , such that x j = y r j . The codeword y r cannot be in every coalition in D 1 because no codeword is in every coalition in D 1 . Let C`be a coalition in D 1 that doesn't contain y r . Since none of the other codewords in S C i 2D 1 C i agree with y r on the jth index, x 6 2 desc(C`), a contradiction.
In order for Theorem 2.9 to be applied, it must be the case that q b(w + 2) 2 =4c. We proved earlier that a w-IPP code does not exist if q w. This leaves open the question of the existence of w-IPP codes for w < q < b(w + 2) 2 =4c. The relationships between the di erent structures we have de ned are summarized in Figure 1 . (Note that the term \CFF" (cover-free family) will be de ned in the next section, and \CFC" (cover-free code) will be de ned in Section 4.) In our codes, we want the value of n to be as large as possible, given values for q, N and w. In this section we discuss some upper bounds on the value of n, which yield necessary conditions for the existence of the codes.
Bounds from Cover-Free Families
In order to obtain our rst bound, we employ a type of set system called a cover-free family.
De nition 3.1 A w-cover-free family is a pair (X; B) , where X is a set of size q and B is a set of subsets of X, such that for any B 0 B with jB 0 j w and for any A 2 BnB 0 , it holds that A 6 B2B 0 B:
A w-cover-free family will be denoted as w-CFF(q; n) if jBj = n. A w-cover-free family is said to be N-uniform if jBj = N for all B 2 B.
Cover-free families have been studied extensively in combinatorics, and also have various applications in computer science, such as group testing algorithms to name one example. There are numerous cryptographic applications of cover-free families; see, for example, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, 16] . Here we consider the relationship between cover-free families and w-FP codes. There is an upper bound for uniform cover-free families, proved by Erd os, Frankl and F uredi in 9], as follows. We can simplify the bound as follows. 
Bounds from Separating Hash Families
Since we have proved some relationships between codes and separating hash families, bounds on SHF will also give us bounds on codes. In this subsection, we investigate some bounds on SHF. First, we state and prove a simple lemma from 4]. Lemma 3.5 Suppose A is an m n matrix on q symbols. If n > q m , then there are at most q m ? 1 non-repeated columns in A . Proof. There are at most q m di erent columns in A, and at least one column is repeated since n > q m .
For a matrix A, we use R A to denote the set of all non-repeated columns. The following theorem gives a bound for SHF(N; n; q; w; 1); the proof is identical to the proof of a bound for PHF due to Blackburn and Wild 4]. Theorem 3.6 Suppose there is an SHF(N; n; q; w; 1). If w 2 and n > w(q e ? 1) , then N > we.
Proof. Suppose N we. Let A = (a i;j ) be the N n matrix obtained from the SHF(N; n; q; w; 1). Divide A into w submatrices of size e n and denote them as A 1 ; A 2 ; ; A w . Thus A 1 = (a i;j ), 1 i e, 1 j n; A 2 = (a i;j ), e + 1 i 2e, 1 j n; etc.
From Lemma 3.5 we have
R A i w(q e ? 1):
Since n > w(q e ? 1) , there is at least one column, say column j 0 , which is disjoint from w i=1 R A i . This is a column N-tuple, say (a 1 ; a 2 ; ; a N ) T . For each i such that 1 i w, we can nd a column in A i , say column j i , which is the same as (a (i?1)e+1 ; a (i?1)e+2 ; ; a ie ) T . Let W = fj 1 ; ; j w g. Then there is no hash function separating fj 0 g and W.
Letting e = d N w e, the above bound on separating hash families gives us a bound which is slightly stronger than Theorem 3.4. We now obtain a bound for SHF(N; n; q; w; w), as follows.
Theorem 3.9 Suppose there is an SHF(N; n; q; w; w This bound is stronger than the previous bound obtained from cover-free families, Theorem 3.7 (of course Theorem 3.7 provides a bound for w-FP codes while Theorem 3.10 does not).
The above bound for w-FP, w-SFP, w-IPP and w-TA codes are the best bounds known for w > 2. For 2-IPP codes, a stronger bound was shown in 12]: Theorem 3.11 In an (N; n; q) 2-IPP code, it holds that n 3q dN=3e .
We can use the same techniques to derive a new upper bound for (w 1 ; w 2 )-SHF. Proof. Suppose there exists an SHF(N; n; q; w 1 ; w 2 ), where all the given conditions hold, but N w 1 e. Let A = (a i;j ) be the N n matrix obtained from the SHF(N; n; q; w 1 ; w 2 ). Divide A into two submatrices of sizes (w 1 ? w 2 + 1)e n and (w 2 ? 1)e n, and denote them as A 1 
Su cient Conditions
In this section, we consider su cient conditions for the existence of the codes of interest. These take two forms: explicit constuctions, utilizing error-correcting codes, and nonconstructive existence results that utilize the probabilistic method 1].
Constructions Using Error-correcting Codes
In 13], a stronger form of CFF was introduced in connection with a broadcast encryption technique. It was also remarked in 13] that this stronger form of CFF could be used to construct traitor tracing schemes. We pursue this theme now, adapting their de nition to the setting of codes that we use in this paper.
De nition 4.1 Suppose that C is an (N; n; q) code. For any subset C 0 C and any The following theorem shows that a CFC code is also a TA code.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that an (N; n; q) code C is a (w; 1 ? 1=w)-CFC. Then C is a w-TA code.
Proof. Suppose x 2 desc(C 0 ), where C 0 C; jC 0 j = w. Then there exists y 2 C 0 such that jI(x; y)j w=N. On the other hand, for any z 2 CnC 0 , jI(x; z)j jI(z; C 0 )j < w=N, since I(z; x) I(z; C 0 ). Thus C is a w-TA code.
Codes with large minimum distance are CFC codes. We prove the following simple result. ). Then C is a w-TA code.
In 17], an explicit construction for w-TA codes was presented that used orthogonal arrays. This construction can be viewed as a corollary of Theorem 4.4 using Reed-Solomon codes. Independently, Reed-Solomon codes were used in 12] to construct 2-IPP codes in a similar fashion. These results are all contained in the following more general theorem. Theorem 4.5 Suppose N; q and w are given, with q a prime power and N q + 1. Then there exists an (N; n; q) w-TA code in which n = q dN=w 2 e .
Proof. Suppose N; q and w are given, with q a prime power and N q+1. Let ), so Theorem 4.4 can be applied. Therefore C is an (N; n; q) w-TA code in which n = q dN=w 2 e .
We note that 12, Theorem 4] is obtained as a corollary of Theorem 4.5 by setting w = 2. Also, 17, Theorem 3.14] is obtained as a corollary by setting N = q + 1.
Nonconstructive Existence Results
The probabilistic method can be used to provide nonconstructive existence results for several of the types of codes considered in this paper. This approach was rst used for PHF by Mehlhorn (see, for example, 14]), and a recent improvement using the Lov asz Local Lemma can be found in 3]. A uniform approach to probabilistic bounds for PHF, SHF, and CFF, as well as a summary of known results, was given in 16].
The probabilistic method was used to prove an existence result for TA codes; the following theorem was proved in 6]. Theorem 4.6 6] There exists an (N; n; q) w-TA code, where q = 2w 2 and N = 4w 2 log n.
An examination of the proof of Theorem 4.6 shows that the code produced is in fact a (w; 1 ? 1=w)-CFC. However, Theorem 4.6 does not compare favourably with the explicit construction presented in Theorem 4.5 | surprisingly, the explicit construction using ReedSolomon codes yields better TA codes than the probabilistic method of Theorem 4.6. This in fact refutes the assertion made in 6], where it is claimed that no explicit constructions are known that are as e cient as Theorem 4.6. However, in the case of 2-IPP codes, the probabistic method was used in 12] to prove a result that is an improvement over Theorem 4.5. 5 Open Problems
